(UNCITRAL) to increase the appeal of arbitration to resolve IP connoversics. For example, the creation of special arbin·ation rules 4 -where interim mea~ures, confidentiality and expertise are so irnportant~, the foregoing debate over the arbitrabilityoflP disputes, and the education through workshops and seminars. 5 The overall hesitancy related to the arbitration ofiP disputes could be linked to the "£1mily jewels" view, which is the idea that the IP rights are d1e asset of the company; so that arbitration is not sufficiently aggressive and "litigation allows greater 'flexibility' in design of one's strateg/' Also, there is the ''venLlJre capitalists-stock market" view, where "the attack on the 'family jewels' may not only take the jewels, but, in_ addition, the perception that the jewels could be taken may cause a loss of investor confidence." Still, there are other ex:pLm.ations to that hesitancy, as the uZeitgeL<Jt of the high technology world )J) or even the "legal culture view. ' 0 One could also add other countcrvoilling considerations. First, there are IP specialized coutts in some countries, which offer greater predictability of decisions result than in arbitration and generatin_gsnunger deterrent effects through publicity. 7 Second, arbitration is often viewed as too costly, md there are not arbinators with as much expettise as other legal practitioners in the IP fie!d. 8 111ird, it could be more strategic for a licensor-that has been licensed in several countries-to bring lawsuits in the markets of it~ choice, discouraging inftingement in other m.arkets by means of publicity. And finally, litigation could be the best choice, due to questions related to the arbitTability ofiP matters, to the non~enforceability of arbin·al awards against third parties, and to the availability of effective interim relief, which is vital do IP disputes. 9 In conLTa."it, Professor William Pmk arf,'LlCS that "the special nature ofiP arbitration is not really all thatspcciaL" 10 I tis true thatiP arbination raises public policy concems, but that is also the case of anLin·ust, securities regulation, and bankruptcy, TI1c reluctance of endorsing arbitration by citing the need fi:)r litigation flexibility and me tits appeal carries certain irony. After all, flexibility is the raison d'ttre of arbitration, and the absence of appeal can be one of the .srt·cat advantages of arbittation. 11 In order to better understand the hesitancy toward arbin·ation in a pmticular jUiisdiction, it is helpful toexarnine other counnies' perspectives. So, the present author opted for this method of analysis, where the Ametican paradigm of arbin·ating IP claims is useful to explain the issues that Brazilian mbiW:ttors face. ~Tilis mticle first exmnines a val d' oLwu the concept of rnandato1y rules of private inten1ational law in the state courts, and then in international arbitration. SpeciilcaHy, the author addresses the effect of mandatory rules on the arbitrability ofiP disputes. Further, this article summarizes the historical fi:amework and the favor arbitrandum developments regarding the mbitrability ofiP issues in the U.S. and BraziL II. Mandatory Rules II. 1. Mandatmy Rules in the Courts Savigny has not ign.ored the notion of llktndatmy rules. 'Ibis great scholm· of the conflicts of law methods described mandatmy rules as "rules of a mandatory character, mandated by general interests". In the early 1940's two Germm1 scholars, Wengler m1d Zweigert, proposed the application of domestic and foreign. mandatory rules on the basis of territoriality, hTespective of the lex cau.~ae. 12 Specifically, the discussion involving mandatory rules in private intemationallaw 14-ts been first addressed by Professor Francescakis in the late 1950's. Even before him, Professor Franz Kahn had already made a distinction betweenAusdelmungsnormen and Anwendungsnonnen. Professor Nt.L'isbaum distinguished choice a flaw rules fi·om spacially conditioned intemalmles. 13 Definitively, the concept of mandatory rules differs from the notion of the classic conflict of law rules of private international law. Traditionally) the European bilateral conflict of law rules operate by connecting legal relationships. The applicable law is determined-the lex causae or in case of a contract the lex contractusthrough the application of connecting factors (place of residence, domicile, main place of business) place of agreement, place of enforcement) etc.), Professor Francescakis explains that the bilateral conflict of law rule is quite abstract 1 \ that is it does not take into account the fact that international contract relationships also have a macro/unction as instruments that regulate international economic and political behavior. 15 The overriding concern of the bilateral conflict of law rules relates to the legal relationship itself, or better, to the balancing of private interests, i.e. the microf~mction of an international contract. As a result, a conflict of law rule indicates the applicable law to govern the relationship at stake.
On the other hand, the so~called ;',American Revolution" brought with it the focus on the purpose and intent of the rule; the center of consideration rests on the policy of substantive rules of the concerned states (' 1 special connection approach" or uSonderanknufJfungstheorie"). 16 This contrasts with the rigid method ofbilatcral conflict of law rules. Thereby, the mandatory rules method adopts a case~by~case approach, so that it is 11 the imperative nature per se of theses rules that make them applicablc." 17 The mandatory rules are therefore material rules of private international law as they directly govern legal relationship, rather than merely indicating the law applicable to it. 18 In the European Union, the Rome Convention gives explicit mention to mandatory rules under its Article 7 (l) and (2). 19 Indeed, it has always been undisputed that a court must apply mandatory rules of the forum even though the parties submitted their contract to a foreign law. The legislative history of Article 7(2), which provides the application of the mandatory rules of the forum, reflects this attitude. 20 Article 7 ( 1) refers to directly applicable rules of other jurisdictions, irrespective of the law applicable to the contract. It is important to note that "whether a rule is conflicts mandatory or not has to be deducted from the rule itself", as it defines its own applicability. Nevertheless, "the will of the legislature is not enough to sustain the application of conflicts mandatory rules of third countries.,.
[because] in addition to the intent of having a rule 14 !d. note 13, p. 107. "La /oi de police permet de tenir compte de Ia teneur concrete des rf:gles, alors que Ia r6gle de conflit, etant abstraite, ne /e peut pas. Un corol!aire de cette observation est que, tandis que /es o3g/es de conflit traitent de categories de rapports juridiques (au de questions de droit), tes lois de police voient leur competence pn:!:cisf:e de faqon ponctuelle. On remarquera que Ia definition proposee est mains celle des lois de police qu'une definition de Ia methode des lois de police, methode df:rogatoire a cel/e du conflit de lois." 15 Natalie Voser, Current Development: Mandatory Rules as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in International Commercial Arbitration, 7 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 319 (1996) , LEXIS at 323. applied, a close connection between the contract and the country where the rule comes from is rcquircd." 21 An important precedent for Article 7 (1) Rome Convention was a Dutch decision in the Alnati case.TI1is has widened the scope of applicability of conflicts mandatory rules of jurisdictions beyond the forum state with which the situation is closely connected. 22 Yet, Member States' courts appear reluctant to consider directly applicable rules of other jurisdictions.V At level of the European Community (EC), Professor Radicati di Brozolo analyzes the European Court of Justice leading case Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Bcnetton 24 , affirming that arbitrators are to give due consideration to EC anti~ trust law. 25 Another example of mandatory rules recognized by the legislature can be verified in Article 19(1) and (2) of the Private International Law ofSwitzerland. 26 In accordance with the practice developed under this provision, four conditions are prerequisite for its application:
(i) Clear evidence that the foreign legal provision is intended to be applied to the case mandatorily (so~called 'h.nwendungswille").
(ii) A close connection between the case and the foreign legal provision (so~called ~'Zusammenh.ang'').
(iii) A preponderant interest of one of the parties that the foreign mandatory provision be taken into account ("schUtzenwerte und offensichtlich Uberwiegende Interessen einer Partei'').
(iv) The relevant interests of the party deserve protection pursuant to the Swiss conception of law ("Normzwecl<. und Ergebniskontrolle"). 27 Thus," li]nternational contracts cannot be isolated within a conceptual vacuum. Though it may be convenient to apply a single law to their main part, the fact that such contracts have effects in other countries which may be vitally important for the parties or those countries themselves cannot be ignored in the name of sanctity of the applicable law." 28 In short, Stefan KrOll explains that:
TI1e justification for the application of conflicts mandatory rules notwithstanding the lex causae stems from the double function of international contracts. Primarily they arc the means by which the parties try to further their interest. ... However, contracts also have a second function in so far as they influence the structure of an economy and regulate the markets ... Given the overwhelming state interests, it is clear that the law applicable in these areas cannot be determined by tbe normal conflict of laws rules for contracts, the main objective of which is to promote private interests. In these fields ofiaw, the decisive criterion for determining the applicable law is not the individual rightness of a contractual relation, but its economical rightness. 29 Moreover, one could say that mand8tory rules "<ire justifiable if society wants to protect ( 1) parties within a contract, or (2) parties outside a contract. " 30 That is, it may be appropriate for the state to adopt a mandatory rule when the parties are unable to protect thetnselvcs when entering a contract (parentalism theory), or when third parties cannot protect themselves from the contract (externalities theory), 31 The first case consists of situations where there is no equilibrium as to the bargaining power of the parties involved, e.g. consumer matters; the second case is appropriate where securities or competition matters are concerned.
As can be noticed, mandatory rules are~by dcfinition~not subject to contractual variation, leaving nothing to contract outY. So) given due consideration to the origins of mandatory rules in state courts, the following subchapter will address the treatment of mandatory rules in arbitration.
II. 2. MandatOJy Rules in Arbitration
Nowadays one of the most difficult questions confronting arbitrators is that of the application of mandatory rules. This issue is prevalent in more than 50% of casesY Indeed, ('the extent to which an international tribunal must have regard to the manclatmy rules of the taw governing the parties' relationship 1 the law of the forurn 1 any supranational order and the law at the potential places of enforcement has been said to be one of the most difficult issues in international arbitration. " 34 11-aditionally, arbitration doctrine and practice tended to refuse the application of rules that were not chosen by the parties. Nonetheless, it is clear that the states would only recognize this private justice) as long as it takes into account the general interests defended by the statc. 35 29 Nevertheless, Professor Pierre Mayer argues that considering the applicability of those rules in arbitration is delicate, since the arbitrators do not have a forum. 36 In fact, from the arbitrators' perspective, the rules can be seen as either part of the lex contractus or not. 37 Professor Goldman goes even beyond that, stCtting that an arbitral tribunal could be viewed as having a universal fOrum. 38 As far as the broad concept of public policy is concerned, Audley Sheppard explains that it embodies the following substantive categories of rules: 11 ( l) mandatory rules/lois de fJolice; (2) fundamental principles oflaw; (3) public order/good morals; ( 4) national interests/ foreign relations. " 39 Similarly, the notion of public policy or ordre J)ublic, according to Daniel liochstrasse1; includes both (l) foreign interventionist rules (Eingriffsnormen) and (2) mandatory rules oflaw. The first ones are provisions that interfere with private rights or relations for governmental or economic reasons. The second ones-mandatory rules-are imperative provisions that govern the intemational relationship, irrespective of the law that was supposed to govern it. These can include competition laws, currency control laws, environmental protection laws, measures of embargo, blockade or boycott, and laws designed to protect the weaker party in legal relationships.
Marc Blessing has classified mandatory rules into different categories. First, as to their origin, he explains that the interfering rules might pertain:
(i) to the proper law of the contract (lex causae); (ii) to the law governing at the place of arbitration (lexfori) 4 D; (iii) to a legal order of a third country; (iv) to a supranational order, such as e.g. resolution of UN Security Council, EU competition laws, other norms pertaining to an international public policy; or 36 Mayer, supra note 13, p. 113. "En un sens Ia position de l'arbitre est plus propice a /'application des lois de police que cel/e du juge. En effet, si aucune loi de police n'est pour lui celle du for, aucune n'est non plus etrangere." 37 Pierre Mayer, L'interference deS lOiS de police, in SEMINAIRE DES 7 ET 8 AVRIL 1986 -l'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 46 (CCI lnstitut, Paris 1986). "L'arbifre n'y a pas pour lui de lois de pOlice du for au de lois de police etrangeres mais simplement des lois de police extf:rieures 8 Ia lex contractus. Toute demi-mesure est done exclue. La position de !'arbitre est aussi plus favorable a une pesee objective des interets qui s'attachent a !'application de Ia toi de police et de ceux qui s'attachent 8 /'application de Ia lex contractus; toutes les lois sont sur un pied d'egatite." 38 D8bats, supra note 13. "[C]omme vous t'avez dit tres exactement, !'arbitre n'a pas de for, mais je voudrais completer un peu votre formule en disant qu'il n'a pas de for national, mais qu'il a un for qui comme celui de romans de Balzac est l'univers. ( v) to the legal order governing at the potentia[ place where enforcement of the award might have to be sought.
Second, he classified the mandatory rules as to the policies and cultural values or social interests that aim to be protected:
(i) some are aimed solely at protecting certain monct::uy interests of the State, such as exchange control. regulations or transfer restrictions;
(ii) some are of a merely policing nature;
(iii) others are aimed at safeguarding certain vital interests of a State and its people's welfare; and, in particular (iv) others arc aimed at protecting the free trade and the functioning of an effective market, such a.-; competition laws.'' 4 i In fact, it is at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal to decide whether or not applying rules other than of the lex contractus. So, the arbitral tribunal "may find that the choice~of~law clause included by the parties in an agreement did not exclude the operation of mandatory rules of other legal systems. '' 42 Hence, the arbitrators could apply mandatory rules as if they were facts like ' 1 force majeure'' or "immorality". In addition, Professor Emmanuel Gaitlard understands that the arbitrators would be under no duty to apply these rules. 43 Professor Pierre Mayer argued that mandatory rules should be applied if <~the mandatory rule belongs to the lex contractus"; if"the parties have not expressly excluded its application"; and if "one of the parties has invoked it before the arbitrators. " 44 But the fact is that there should be "no justification for assuming that the mandatory rules of the lex contractus have a special and paramount position and that therefore the interests of the state that provides the lex contractus have to be respected with less scrutiny than the interests of other." 45 So, the author of this paper agrees with Christophe Seraglini when arguing that the applicability of mandatory rules derived from the lex contractus, from the place of arbitration and from third states, should be given the same consideration, as long as one can verify an effective link between the mandatory provisions and the controversy at stake. In other words, mandatory rules are to be applied if their applicability seems to be legitimate. Hence, "just as freedom of contract ... finds its limits at certain mandatory rules, the freedom of choice of law, which is nothing more than a different expression of the freedom of contract on the international level, flnds its limit.s at the mandatory and applicable rules of the law affected by an international agreement. " 47 And, apart from this argument for the application of mandatory rules, there would be also the argument for the efficiency of the arbitral system. After all, one of the main concerns of international arbitration is a recognizable and enforceable rendering of arbitral awards; that is, arbitrators should think of the future of the award.
So, it is important to emphasize that the limits found in the mandatory rules applicable to certain international legal relationship may affect the arbitrability of this legal relationship. This is covered in the following chapter.
Ill. Arbitrability and Intellectual Property Mandatory Rules
Arbitrabilitymeam the capabilityofbeing subject to arbitration. TIUs concept establishes the diving line between where the exercise of contractual freedom ends and the public mission of adjudication begins.
Public policy in relation to arbitrability, even if it may still be a defense against enforcement, concerns the very beginning and basis of arbitration, namely the arbitration agreement or arbitration clause. 48 And, u [ t]he question of whether international mandatory rules have an effect on arbitrability should be basically be treated similarly to the general question of whether mandatory rules have an influence on the choice of rhe applicable law." 49 Professor Pictcr Sanders explains that"! t] he domain of arbitration, i.e. the extent to which parties may submit disputes to arbitration, depends in the first place on the applicable arbitration law." In addition, the domain of arbitration also relics on the legislator and on the courts-depending on the way they interpret the applicable law. 5° National arbitration laws may adopt different formulas as to the domain of arbiLTation. For instance, they can determine that disputes in respect of which it is permitted to compromise, or which are at free disposition of the parties, etc., are arbitrable. But whatever general formula is used, an award rendered outside the domain of arbitration could be considered againsr the public policy of a given countryY In essence, since it is a matter of national public policy, arbitrability can differ from one country to another. 52 from different angles. Therefore the freedom of the parties to opt for arbitration as an alternative to litigation may have different nuances. 53 To startt subjective and objective arbitrability should be distinguished. Subjective arbitrability (ratione [Jersonae) concerns whether a party, under the applicable law, may be permitted to agree on an arbitration clause. In contrast, objective arbitrability (ratione materiae) relates whether, under the applicable law, the parties may submit a certain dispute to arbitration. 54 So, this paper will address objective arbitrability only. That is, the effect of mandatory rules on the arbitrability ofiP disputes.
Lack of arbitrability can be raised before the arbitral tribunal or before a national court even while the arbitral proceedings are pending. Still, the arbitral decision may be subject to judicial review, where a state court may take a ((second look" at the arbitrability of the dispute either in a motion to set aside the arbitral award, or in a challenge of the final award at the recognition and enforcement stage. 5 5
Both the U.S. and Brazil are parties to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereinafter ((New York Convention"). 56 As far as this convention is concerned, the issue of arbitrability can be raised at two different stages: first, on the level of the enforcement of the arbitration agreement; and second, on the level of the enforcement of the arbitral award. 57 In these circumstances, the mandatory rule oflaw governing the arbitrability plays an important role. 1l1erefOre, one must establish a criterion in order to determine it. 52 For further comments on the effects of pub!ic policy on arbitrability see JEAN~BAPTISTE At the stage of enforcement of the arbitration agreement (Article II(3) New York Convention) 1 the law applicable to objective arbitrability is subject to considerable debate in the literature. Accordingly~ Professor Albert van den Berg lists a wide range of solutions: (1) the law of the forum; (2) the law applicable to the arbitration agreement;
(3) the law of the place of arbitration; ( 4) the law applicable to the merits; (5) the law of the country where enforcement of the award is sought; (6) the substantive rule of inten1ational h1w; and (7) a cumulative applicability of the foregoing. The vast majority of courts tend to apply the lex fori to determine objective arbitrability of disputes. 58 At the stage of enforcement of the arbitral award (Article V(2) New York Convention), the state court may take into account its own law when determining the domain of arbitration. 5 9 Notwithstanding the position described above by Professor Albert van den Berg 1 Homayoon Arfazadeh argues that the arbitrability issues should not be treated as a problem of conflict of laws 1 but rather of conflict of jurisdiction. Accordingly 1 he suggests the application of the lex fori to arbitrability matters since these issues derive from the compulsory jurisdiction of national courts JJrompted by jJublic [Jolicy. 60 In contrast to the position of the two authors above mentioned~ Marc Blessing concluded that "the issue of arbitrability should not be impaired by taking into account or applying any foreign mandatory rules of law; should not be impaired by the arbitrator 1 s concerns as to the enforceability of his award; but should be denied only if indeed the affirmation of arbitrability be regarded as a fundamental violation of public policy (as applicable in international affairs). \\ 61 The au thor of the present paper believes that the position argued by Homayoon
Arfazadeh regarding the application of the lex fori both to the challenge of an arbitral agreement and to the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award might lead to certain rrlex forism", that is 1 an excessive application of the lex fori. Forum shopping must be minimized, even if it is true that its abolishment in toto is impracticable considering the plurality of jurisdictions and the multitude of interpretations that may arise out of a single provision of uniform L:nv, e.g. European Union Conventions. So, the above interpretation of Articles II (3) and V(2) New York Convention by Professor Arrhor van den Berg seems to be more appropriate. Like all other property rights 1 IP rights are secured by the state. Hence~ ~'a patent is secured by a patent grant, a trademark or service marks, by registration, and copyrights and trade secrets by operation oflaw 1 either statute or common law. In so doing, some countries disfavor the arbitrability of IP rights 'ibccause the exclusionary property rights contained in registrations can be enforced against anyone." Inasmuch as an exclusionary property right confers rights on the holder against the rest of the world, the IP rights contain a per se implication of a virtually infinite number of parties. 63 Nonetheless, many countries permit the arbitration ofiP rights, considering IP disputes capable of settlerncnt and therefore arbitrable. 64 It is essential to clarify thm there are two distinct sources ofiP rights under the law. Hrst, IP rights can be created by the act of a sovereign state, and usually these rights are recorded in a state register and limited to a time period, e.g. patent rights, certain copyrights, trade names, trade logos, insignias, and certain trademarks. So, it may be argued that the court.·.; of a particular State would have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate issues related to these rights. 65 Second, there are IP rights that are created solely by the 8Cts of the eventual holder of the right, e.g. trade secrets, certain copyrights, and common law trademarks. With these rights, there are much less plausible arguments that would go against their arbitrability. 66 Marc Blessing suggests a similar distinction based on whether the IP rights exist independently of registration. In general, the IP rights that do not depend on registration arc copyright, trade secrets, and know~ how related rights. Moreover, in many countries, for instance Germany, U.K., and Italy, all kinds of distinctive si~:,rt1s, such as trade names, emblems, signs, slog;:ms, titles of books, rnagazines or newspapers, and the get~up of products can be protected as trademarks, even if they have not been registered by the owner. In addition, in the U.K. and in France unregistered design rights exist as well. 67 Regardless of whether the IP rights ( 1) were or not created by the holder, and (2) were or not registered, the IP rights are created against all third parties. ln contrast, international commercial arbitration involves generally two parties to a contract so that in the arena ofiP law cerrain limitations can be put on the so~called party autonomy. 68 For instance, controversies related to trade secrets, know~ how, or confidential information are proper subject matter for arbitration in most countries. After all, being of private nature, these rights do not arise out of registration or examination. Yet, as far as injunctive relief is concerned, the public interest might be involved, and therefore it lTlay affect both arbitrabHity and enforceability. Then it is suggested that the parties be aware of the policies in the place of arbitration and in forums of possible enforcement of the awan._-1. 66 /d. (noting that when creating an industrial or commercial secret and its subsequent defense, such as preservation of its confidentiality and the protection against its inadvertent disclosure the trade secret holder creates its own right; and that when the copyright holder notifies the public on each publication of the materia! that the material is copyrighted, he/she creates its right as well). 67 Blessing, supra note 3, p. 201-202. 68 Donahey, supra note 66, at 729. 69 David W. Plant, Myths and Misunderstanding Re Two Significant Aspects of ADR, SB41 AU~ABA 287 {Dec. 12, 1996), WL SB41 AU-ABA 287, 296-297.
As for licensing or other contTact rights, contractual disputes arc typically arbitrable, as long as decision does not affect third parties, But a dispute as to the validity of a licensed patent may not be arbitrable in many countries. Here, injuctive relief may also affect arbitrability and enforceability. 70 It has been argued that the arbitrability of IP matters depends on the nature of the claim at stake. Matters related to ownership of intellectual property rights arc far more controversial in tenus of arbitrability, as they fall within the public interest because they relate to a grant or to a registration with a public authority. 71 Infringement disputes raise polemic issues as weU.n The same happens with cases regarding the validity and enforceability of patents and trademarks, as the majority of countries do not pem1it arbitration over these issues. 73 Professor Pieter Sanders argues that the 70 !d., at 297. 71 /d., at 297-298. (mentioning that "[c]ountries which appear to enforce arbitral awards regarding the ownership of registered intellectual property rights include Australia, Beigium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, China, Denmark, England, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Switzerland and the United States.The arbitrability of such rights appears to be improper, or at lest in doubt, in Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden."}. 72 See Pagenberg, supra note 8 {stating that in Germany "[p]atent rights as such are assignable and can therefore be the subject of arbitration, and they can also be licensed ( § 15, Patent Act}. It also goes without saying that a patentee can renounce his patent ( § 20, Patent Act). It is, therefore, the prevailing opinion that there are no limitations to the arbilrability of patent infringement matters. Limitations exist however with respect to nullity proceedings.") See a/so Plant, supra note 70, at 298. (explaining that "Belgium, Canada, Switzerland and the United States permit the arbitration of disputes as to scope and infringement under most circumstances. Czechoslovakia, Denmark, England, Finland, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden favor arbitration of scope and infringement disputes provided that the arbitral award does not affect third parties or the public. The arbitrability of scope and infringement disputes is not permitted in Hungary, Israel and Mexico and is in doubt in Brazil, Australia, France and Korea.") Also Grantham, supra note 64, at 200-201 (commenting that in Argentina the copyright, trademark, patent and industrial model and design laws provide for penal sanction in the event of infringement, so that infringement issues relate to illegal acts, which are not arbitrable). n Pian!, id., at 299. (commenting that in '·[a] few countries, such as Belgium, Canada, Great Britain, Switzerland and the United States, appear to permit arbitration of validity questions regarding patents and trademarks.")
For an overview on the arbitrability of patent valid'1ty, see also Paul M. Janicke, "Maybe we shouldn't arbitrate": Some Aspects of the Risk/Benefit Calculus of Agreeing to Binding Arbitration of Patent Disputes, 39 Hous. L. REv. 693 (2002), WL 39 HOULR 698~700. (explaining !hat "[r]he situation with respect to validity is more complex. Only a few countries-including Canada, Switzerland, and the United States~have explicitly embraced arbitrability of the question of patent validity of patents issued by them. Other countries, such as France and Italy, seem to follow a more restricted view, invoking the concept of ordre public to conclude that the question of validity is not arbitrable, but instead is subject to determination only by a public tribunaL In yet another group of countries the issue is subdivided. Private parties may arbitrate the validity question, but the result is binding only as between the parties and cannot bring about a general nullity as against oiher accused infringers. This situation appears to exist in Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. For Japan, some commentators indicate that an arbitral determination of 'invalidity will not have general effect absent an inval'1dation decision from the Patent Office, but the lack of such decision would not seem to preclude the availability of invalidity as an affirmative defense in an arbitration. Additional complications for arbitrability are posed by the laws of some countries. In Argentina, a criminally illegal activity cannot be arbitrated, and unfortunately, patent infringement is such an activity. In China, the authority to conduct an arbitration that has international characteristics is vested exclusively in the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAcrso it does not appear possible for the parties to determine by contract how such arbitrations will be conducted. Brazil apparently follows the ordre public concept mentioned earlier, so that the question of patent validity is regarded as inarbitrable. In Canada, despite the general approbation of arbitrability of patent disputes, the whole question remains unclear because the Canadian courts have not squarely addressed the arbitrability of patent cases.") Also, Briner, supra note 49. non,arbitrability of the validity of patents or trademarks is quite expected, as 11 a fortiori an arbitrator cannot f:,:rrant these rights." 74 Hence, "[wlhere intellectual properly affords themvncr the right to exclude the public from unauthorized use of the property, the intellectual property is manifestly imbued with the public interest" so that "there is troublesome uncertainty about the arbitrability of disputes where intellectual property rights are at issue-specially when different rights granted by different authorities are concerned." 75 Now, this paper turns to the analysis of the question of arbitTability ofiP disputes in the U.S. and in BraziL
III. 1. American Approach
Historically, the U.S. courts tended to consider that extrajudicial resolution of disputes would oust their jurisdiction. 111is was based on the English Co nun on~ Law view that agreements to arbitTate were inherently revocable and therefore contrary to public policy. 76 Due to the expansion of world trade after the World War I and the treaties on arbitration in 1923 and 1927, the trading countries of the West increasingly enacted arbitration statutes. 77 The New York Arbitration Act of 1920 was the first modem arbitration statute in the U.S. that supported both institutional and ad hoc arbitration. 78 Considering the flooding of the courts, and the lobbying efforts of several business organizations, including a proposal made by the American Bar Association, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was enacted in 1925. 79 It was "designed to reverse centuries of judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements and heralded the beginning of clear congressional support for a national policy honoring those agrecments." 80 In 1926 the American Arbitration Association was formed, estabLishing an organized system of arbitrating commercial disputes. 81 Since then, the U.S. has expressed its commitment to international arbitration by becoming a party to several international treaties that govern arbitration, such as the New York Convention. 8 z These developments converged with the U.S. Supreme Court's elaboration of a federal doctrine on international connnerciallitigation and arbitration. 5 3 Accordingly, agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards had to be enforced. Enforcement was crucial because predictability in international commerce and the furthering of U.S. economic interests were extremely necessary. 5 4 In addition, the U.S. Congress has been active in passing legislation favoring arbitration. For example, in the early 1970s, several acts reflected the legislature's new determination to include arbitration explicitly in the statutory text, as in the Ti·ans~Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973 115 , and in the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974. 86 (a) A contract involving a patent or any right under a patent may contain a provision requiring arbitration of any dispute relating to patent validity or infringement arising under the contract. In the absence of such a provision, the parties to an existing patent validity or infringement dispute may agree in writing to settle such dispute by arbitration. Any such provision or agreement shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except for any grounds that exist at law or in equity for revocation of a contract. (b) Arbitration of such disputes, awards by arbitrators and confirmation of awards shall be governed by title 9, United States Code, to the extent such title is not inconsistent with this section. In any such arbitration proceeding, the defenses provided for under section 282 of this title shall be considered by the arbitrator if raised by any party to the proceeding. (c) An award by an arbitrator shall be final and binding between the parties to the arbitration but shall have no force or effect on any other person. The parties to an arbitration may agree that in the event a patent which is the subject matter of an award is subsequently determined to be invalid or unenforceable in a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction from which no appeal can or has been taken, such award may be modified by any court of competent jurisdiction upon appiication by any party to the arbitration. Any such modification shall govern the rights and obligations between such parties from the date of such modification. (d) When an award is made by an arbitrator, the patentee, his assignee or licensee shall give notice thereof in writing to the Commissioner. There shall be separate notice prepared for each patent involved in such proceeding. Such notice shall set forth the names and addresses of the parties, the name of the inventor, and the name of the patent owner, shall designate the number of the patent, and shall contain a copy of the award. If an award is modified by a court, the party requesting such modification shall give notice of such modification to the Commissioner. The Commissioner shall, upon receipt of either notice, enter the same in the record of the prosecution of such patent. If the required notice is not filed with the Commissioner, any party to the proceeding may provide such notice to the Commissioner. At this point, the author commences the analysis on arbitrability regarding specific areas of patent rights, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets.
a.
Patents Soon after the enactment ofFJV\ of1925, the patent exception to arbitrability was first recognized in 1.930 in Zip Manufacturing Co. v. Pep ManufacturingCoY 4 Nonetheless, in 1982 the U.S. Congress made some amendments to the patent laws, but still took no position on whether the Zip line of cases had correctly interpreted the FAA. 95 In fact, the U.S. Congress legislatively overruled the patent version of the public policy exception. After all, the FAA was also considered to represent a "public policy" choice, as long as the arbitration system enhances the patent system and encourages innovation, that is to say that it would be less costly both to the parties and to the public. 96 The Court of AppeaLs for the Federal Circuit seems to favor arbitration. r:or instance, in In re Medical Engineering Corporation, the court of appeals upheld a district court order staying a patent infringement action in favor of arbitration. 97 Moreover, in Rhone, Poulenc Specialities Chimiques v. SCM Corp., the court of appeals broadly construed the scope of an arbitration clause, in order to include issues regarding infringement and the scope of the licensed patent claims. 98 As for rhe statutory change of 1982, arbitral awards are binding inter partes only, and the parties may agree that the arbitral award will be modified where a court later makes a final decision on the validity or enforceability of the patent. Besides that, the enforcement of the arbitral award depends on whether the patentee gives the required notice of the award to the Commissioner of Patents and 11-ademarks (CPT) . 99 Moreover, as far as the statutory change of 1984 is concerned, there has been some doubt as to the value of arbitration in the area of patent interferences, since the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is not considered bound to any patentability determinations. In Utter v. Hiraga, the language of the 35 U.S.C. § 135 (d) was understood not to preclude an arbitrator to make a patentability determination, although this is subject to the CPT's review. 1 
c-o
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, in Farrel Corp. v. U.S. lntemational Trade Commission, refused ''to pennit arbitration to supersede the jurisdiction of the U.S. International11:ade Com.mission (fTC) over IP issues arising in a 19 U.S.C. § 13337 (a) proceeding." 101 The ITC complaint was on the grounds of misappropriation of trade secrets, trademark infringement, and false representations as to source. The Court of Appeals understood that there was a legal constraint that foreclosed arbitration, based on the Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Cluysler-Piymouth holding that: [a] party to an international transaction will be required to honor its agreement to arbitrate disputes involving statutory claims under U.S. law when the arbitration agreement re<J.ches the statutory issues and when there are no legal constraints external to the agreement which foreclose arbitration of such claims. 102 Indeed, the Court of Appeals found that the Mitsubishi rationale was confined to judicial proceedings and not applicable to administrative proceedings, as in those of the ITC. The court also mentioned the case Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., where an arbitration agreement was regarded as a waiver of access only to a judicial forum, but not to an administrative forum. 103 ln short, the Farrel decision concerns the impact of an arbitration agreement after an ITC investigation has commenced. 104 b.
Copyright Unlike a patent dispute, disputes concerning copyright usually do not involve a contractual relationship, which could entail an arbitration agreement. Hence, this may be considered a reason for the lower amount of cases involving the arbitrability of copyright issues, since the parties tend to litigate their disputes. 105 Even though the U.S. Congress did not expressly authorize arbitration for copyright disputes in the Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act) i0 6 or under Tide 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations 107 , copyright license agreements may provide for arbitration. In Kamakazi Music Corp. 'V. Robbins Music Corp., the Court of Appeals endorsed the arbitrability of copyright infringement claims where copyright matters other than validity were at stake. 108 In so doing, the court held that in ''the circumstances of ... [this] case, the arbitrator had jurisdiction to make an award under the Copyright Act," and that "the arbitration clause was broad enough to encompass Copyright Act claims which required interpretation of the contract". 109 Moreover, the court found that public policy grounds could not prevent the submission of copyright infringe1nent issues to arbitration, since what falls within the public policy scope is the limited monopoly created by a valid copyright. 110 As can be noticed from this decision, the validity of a copyright was not at issue.
In contrast, there are examples where all copyright claims were held arbitrable, including validity. 111 In Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that '\m arbitrator may determine the validity of a copyright when the issue arises in a copyright license lawsuit. " 112 Furthermore, the court stated that since antitrust issues involving an economic monopoly, and since patent validity issues could be subject to arbitration, there was no reason to prohibit arbitration of much less dangerous monopolies; that is, copyright monopolies are less dangerous than patent ones. 113 However, the court made clear that any arbitral decision concerning validity would only be binding on the parties and could not be established against all potential infringers. 114 Besides this Seventh Circuit decision, the Forth and the Second Circuit made explicit the growing trend favoring arbitration. 115 StilC the arbitrability of copyrights is not quite settled. After all, one could argue that "an infringement or validity claim arising out of a copyright license dispute regarding, for instance, royalties, is probably arbitrable after Saturday Evening Post; yet, if the claim is based on federally registered copyright and relies directly on the Copyright Act, the claim is not arbitrable." 116 "' 37 C.F.R. § § 201.1-211.6 (1992 1994 ) (ruling that the presence of complex copyright issues did not preclude arbitration of the dispute); and Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108 (2nd Cir. 1993) (affirming arbitrators' resolution of an issue as to the ownership of copyrights)). 116 Nag, supra note 95, at 16.
c. Trademarks
The area of trademarks is not as developed as that of patent law, due the lack of contractual relationships between the parties. As a result, there is not sufficient incentive to pursue arbitration. Like copyrights, no federal or state authority has provisions regarding binding arbitration to trademark disputes. 117 David Plant explains that ' 1 ln contrast to patent rights and copyrights, rights in a trademark in the U.S. arise primarily under the common law as the result of appropriate use of the mark. Such rights may be augmented by registration pursuant to the Federal Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, or by registration to one or more state trademarks acts, or both." So, as for trademark matters, validity appears to be arbitrable where the issues arise out of a license agreement, rather than a federal trademark statute. 118 But this was not what was decided in Wyatt Earp Enterprises v. Sackman, Inc., in which Wyatt Earp claimed trademark infringement after the expiration of the license agreement. In this case the court held that, because the claim was a tort cause of action rather than a contract dispute, it was not covered by the arbitration clause. 119 Three years later the same court, in Saucy Susan Products, Inc. v. Allied Old English, Inc., decided ~hat disputes over tradernarks and trade names were arbitrable, considering decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit favoring arbitration. 120 In Homewood Industries, Inc. v. CaldwelL however, a district court in Illinois found that trademark infringement claims were not arbitrable, holding that the jurisdiction of the district court over a cause of action arising under the federal trademark (and patent) laws was exclusive pursuant to 28 US.C § 1338. But this party's <J.ssumption that the Congress' intent not to allow arbitration had grounds on the absence of a provision regarding arbitration in the 'TJ-ademark Law. 122 Moreover, in U.S. Diversified Industrles, Inc. v. Barrier Coatings Corporation, a district court understood that the trademark infringement issue was within the scope of the broad arbitration agreement. 123 This decision reveals the need of care when drafting arbitration clauses in the IP arena. 124 Or, even better, it means that arbitrability of these issues remains somewhat unsettled.
d. 1i-ade Secrets
Similar to copyright and trademark matters, neither federal nor state legislation provides for arbitration of trade secret misappropriation issues. Prior to the leading cases on the arbitrability of antitrust disputes, there was some hesitancy as to the arbitration of trade secrets due to competition law conccrns. 125 For instance, in A. & E. Pbstik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., the Ninth Circuit held that, due to these concerns, a trade secret dispute could not be arbitrable. 126 So, after the U.S. Supreme Court's last rulings on the arbitrability of antitrust cases 127 , in Aerojet~ General Corp. v. Machine TOol Works, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's order to arbitrate claims related to trade secret misappropriation. 128 In addition, the legal treatment of trade secrets is 1norc local, as it is made by state courts, and therefore it is different from that of patent, copyright, and trademark infringement, which are bound up in federal law and so implicate certain public policy and exclusive jUlisdiction issues. Hence, courts <:1re likely to hold that trade secret claims arc arbitrable. 129 
Ill. 2. Brazilian Approach
In Brazil, arbitration canl:e traced back to Imperial times. 130 Until1866, the Q)mrnercial Ox:le of1850 provided formandatmyarbitration for certain issues. Arbitration was uniformly regulated in the countlywith the enacm1ent of the Civil Procedure Code of1939, which was replaced by the Civil Indeed, only after the enactment of the Arbitration Law of 1996 did arbitration receive enhanced credibility in Brazil. Before, arbitration agreements were not capable of specific performance, so that the party refusing to arbitrate could simply pay damages for breach of the arbitration clause instead of being actually bound by the arbitration clause. Furthermore, for the recognition of foreign arbitral awards by the Sufm~mo Tribunal FederaL, or Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (STF), the so-called 11 J)rocesso de homologaqiio de sentenqa arbilral estrangeira", or recognition of foreign judgments procedure 138 , required both the homologayao or recognition in the country where the arbitral award was made and in Brazil in order to enforce it in BraziL Thus, at the international level, Brazil did not have a good reputation concerning international arbitration. 1bday, before foreign arbitral awards arc referred to a state court for execution, the STF's recognition procedure still covers issues reb ted to the compliance with service requirements and public policy interests. 139 In contrast to its U.S. counterpart, the Brazilian law on objective arbitrability is based upon express provisions oflaw. According to Article 1 of the Brazilian Arbitration Law, property rights that involve rights at free disposal of the parties may be subject to arbitration (direitos J)(!tTirnoniais disponiveis). !·JOIn so doing, contractually accessible rights differ from statutory rights in the sense that the latter are political commands, enacted in the name of the common good, which are for or against certain types of conduct or groups in society. In this case, non-arbitrabLlity would arise where private autonomy ceases and collective interests take hold. 141 135 
Moreover, either in case a Labor Union is involved in a labor dispute or in case arbitration
is foreseen under a statutory provision, arbitration involving labor law may take place. 151 Stitt, there is much uncertainty regarding arbitrabi!ity of disputes in Brazil 152 , and that applies to IP matters as well.
In Brazil IP disputes are considered potentially arbitrable, since property rights are considered generally arbitrable. But the controversial question is where to draw a line between freely and non~disposable rights. In this sense, one has to look for limits arising out of public policy concerns.
For instance, Article 75, § 3 of the Lei de Propriedade Industrial, or Law on Industrial Property No. 9.279 of J 996 (UP) 153 requires special governmental authorization for the grant of patents that relate to the national security. Definitively, matters related to this kind of situation are not arbitrable. After all, the Brazilian public policy would be at issue.
A similar rationale would apply for the arbitrability over the validity matters. Article 57 of the LIP mandates that causes of actions concerning the nullity of patents, industrial design, and trademarks must fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of Brazilian federal courts, where the INPI--in case it is not the claimant-is to intervene obligatorily. 154 Of course, this does not mean that an arbitrator could not even consider the validity of an IP right in rendering an award, but rather, that he/she cannot declare the nullity of an IP right and intend it to be effective erg a omnes.
Under Article 18 LIP, major concerns, such as morals, security, public health, and public policy are noted, so that the IP disputes involving these issues would not be arbitrable. 155 Finally, it is important to stress that the InsUtuto Nacional de ProfJriedade Intelectual, or National Institute for Intellectual Property (INPI), recognized the possibility of including arbitration clauses in licensing and know,how contracts. 157 '1l1us, it appears that IP disputes that are arbitrable include those capable of settlement such as patent licenses, trademark assigrnncnts, publishing contracts and franchising agreements. Nonetheless, given the previous considerations, questions that raise public policy issues probably render disptncs arising thereof non,arbitrable.
Either way, in Brazil "experimentation" witl have to be the word of the day, as for now there have not been many judicial decisions on this topic. 158
IV Conclusion
An English judge in 1984 envisioned public policy as: "a very unruly horse, and when once you get: astride it you never know where it: will carry you. It may lead you from sound law. It is never argued at all, except when other points fail." 159 Hence, the truth is that: both uncertainty and inconsistencies concerning the interpretation and application of public policy by State courts encourage the losing party in arbitn_ition to rely on public policy to resist, or at least delay, enforcement. Perhaps to keep that 11 unruly horse" over control there could be a harmonization of the notion of public policy around the vvorld. 160 But it is true that much has to be done in order to get to this distant and perhaps even idyllic goal. The modern world's growing exploitation ofiP collides with the principle of territoriality of IP rights. '' 161 And, in order to tackle with this endeavor, state courts, arbitral tribunals, legislative and executive bodies, and legal scholars need to join efforts.
As for arbitration, it: would be quite unsound if it were indifferent to the general interests identified by the law, even if arbitrators are reluctant to see the ship founder 162 , in case they had to declare the non,arbitrability of a dispute. The present author agrees with Marc Blessing that the arbitrators arc neither the guardians of the interests of States, nor the obedient servants of the parties. i 63 Hence, there must be a balance, where arbitrators keep an eye on the limits of arbitrable matters, in order to promote the so-called efficiency of the arbitration system. 
